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NORMAN J.DUDLEY*

Water Allocation by Markets,
Common Property and Capacity
Sharing: Companions or

Competitors?
ABSTRACT
Capacity Sharing is a new way of defining and allocating rights
to flowing and stored surface water in a river valley. It is as if each
user ofwater, or group ofusers, has their own small reservoir on their
own small stream to manage independently from others. Hence it provides a very sound basis for the market allocation of private property
rights, about which there has been a recent surge in the literature,
especially with respect to the western United States. A similar surge,
although spread more widely both in its geographic emphasis and
across academic disciplines, is in the literature on common property
approaches to resource management. Whereas the common property
approach may work well for small water resource systems, it is inappropriate for the management of large systems. However, because
capacity sharing minimizes the interdependence of behavior between
users of system water, it provides a very good basis for dividing up
such large systems among a number of independent, multi-purpose
groups each operating their sub-system as a common property
resource. Similarly, capacity sharing allows a harmonious mix of private property and common property resource management of the subsystems within river valley systems.
The world is amazed at the speed and extent of the recent rightward movement away from centralized economic planning in favor of
market-based approaches, especially in eastern Europe. Water has been
caught up in this swing, particularly in England and Wales, with the
privatization of the water supply industry But that privatization is not to
be confused with the recent surge in the literature on the market allocation
of water as a resource, especially on the maturing water economy of the
western United States.
Water resources usually exist as state property, private property,
or common property The ground swell of interest in the market allocation
* Dr. Dudley is University, Fellow, Centre for Water Policy Research, University of New
England, New South Wales. The author gratefully acknowledges comments from anonymous referees, with the usual caveat. This research was supported by the Australian Land
and Water Resources Research and Development Corporation's Scientific Merit Program
Project SM88/19.
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in the western United States and elsewhere implies institutional arrangements which treat water as a private property resource, even though the
state may continue to 'own' the resource in some cases. Also, there has
been a surge of interest in common property resource management,
although spread over a broader literature. It involves the treatment of natural resources, especially commonly held land resources, as common
property so their management and allocation is achieved by group cooperation and community action rather than by individuals influenced by
the invisible hand of the market.
This author has been involved in another recent development in
the water resources literature-the concept of Capacity Sharing (CS). It
grants individual users, or groups of users, rights to both streamflows and
reservoir storage space in such a way that each can manage their individual subsystems with almost no interference from others. It is as if each
user has his own small reservoir on his own small stream. The purpose of
this paper is to demonstrate that CS has an important potential role as an
institutional arrangement for improving the management and allocation
of water where surface reservoir storage is an important component of the
water supply system, in conjunction with private property, common property, or both.
This paper begins by briefly and selectively surveying the recent
literature on the market-based approach, followed by a similar survey of
the common property literature. The evolving concept and features of CS
are then presented before discussing its potential role as a facilitator of the
market and common property approaches, whether operated in separate
systems or both in the same system. Hence the subjects of the two recent
surges in the literature, the market based approach and the common property approach, are not incompatible with respect to water-both may
function very well even when operating together with CS in the same
river basin water supply system.

A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO
THE WATER MARKET LITERATURE
Although a number of well known authors were concerned with
water markets in the western United States prior to the 1980s,1 the literal. See, e.g., R. Anderson, The Irrigation Water Rental Market: A Case Study, 13 Agric. Econ.
Res. 54 (1961); R. Anderson, Windfall Gains From Transfer of Water Allotments Within the Colorado-Big Thompson Project,43 Land Econ. 265 (1967); C. Ditwiler, Water Problems and Property
Rights--An Economic Perspective,15 Nat. Res. J.663 (1975); L. Hartman & D. Seastone, Water
Transfers: Economic Efficiency and Alternative Institutions (1970); J. Hirshleifer et al., Water
Supply: Economics, Technology, and Policy (1960); C. Howe and K. Easter, Interbasin Transfers of Water; Economic Issues and Impacts (1971); D. Johnson, An Optimal State Water Law:
Fixed Water Rights and Flexible Market Prices, 57 Va. L. Rev. 345 (1971); M. Kelso, et al., Water
Supplies and Economic Growth in an Arid Environment (1973); A. Maass & R. Anderson....
and the Desert Shall Rejoice (1978); F Trelease, Water Law and Economic Transfers of Water, 43 J.
Farm Econ. 1147 (1961).
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ture has burgeoned in the 1980s. It ranges from the advocating 2 to the pessimistic. 3 Victor Brajer, Al Church, Ronald Cummings and Phillip Farah
discuss general strengths and weaknesses
of water markets; 4 Richard
5
losers.
and
winners
Gardner considers
As would be expected, many authors-both economists and lawyers-focus on property rights to surface water, especially under the doctrine of prior appropriation. 6 H. Stuart Burness and James P Quirk argue
that inefficiencies can arise under the doctrine of prior appropriation due
to unequal risk sharing among water users. 7 Other authors stress the need
for security of tenure in water rights to encourage
investment coupled
8
with flexibility to allow adaptation to change.
The important effect of water transfers on return flows and other
factors which impact on third parties is considered by many authors. The
attempt to reduce these impacts is seen as an important reason for high
transaction costs which inhibit market transfers. 9 In particular, Robert A.
2. See e.g., T. Anderson, Water Crisis: Ending the Policy Drought (1983); T. Anderson, The
Market Alternativefor HawaiianWater, 25 Nat. Res. J. 893 (1985); R. Young, Market Versus Nonmarket Management of Irrigation Water: A Review of the Issues, Presented at the Water and
Water Policy in World Food Supplies Conference (May 26-30,1985).
3. See, e.g., A. Chan, To Market or Not to Market: Allocation of InterstateWaters, 29 Nat. Res. J.
529 (1989).
4. See V. Brajer et al., The Strengths and Weaknesses of Water Markets as They Affect Water Scarcity and Sovereignty Interests in the West, 29 Nat. Res. J. 489 (1989).
5. See R. Gardner, Water Marketing-Idaho Style, Presented at the Meeting of the American Water Resource Ass'n (1985).
6. See, e.g., W. Balleau, Water Appropriationand Transferin a General Hydrogrologic System, 28
Nat. Res. J.269 (1988); K. Boulding, The Implications of Improved Water Policy, Presented at
Western Water Resources: Coming Problems and the Policy Alternatives Symposium (Sept.
1979); S. Ciracy-Wantrup & R. Bishop, 'Common Property'as a Concept in Natural ResourcesPolicy, 15 Nat. Res. J. 713 (1975); S. Clyde, Adapting to the ChangingDemandfor Water Use Through
Continued Refinement of the PriorAppropriation Doctrine: An Alternative Approach to Wholesale
Reallocation, 29 Nat. Res. J. 435 (1989); Ditwiler, supranote 1; N. Johnson & C. DuMars, A Survey of the Evolution of Western Water Law in Response to ChangingEconomic and Public Interest
Demands,29 Nat. Res. J. 347 (1989); R. Johnson et al., The Definitionof a Surface Water Right and
Transferability,24 J. Law and Econ. 273 (1981); W. Schaab, Prior Appropriation,Impairment,
Replacements, Models and Markets, 23 Nat. Res. J. 25 (1983); F. Trelease, Alternatives to Appropriation Law, in Water Needs for the Future (V. Nanda ed., 1977); J. Westcoat, Jr., On Water Conservation and Reform of the PriorAppropriation Doctrine in Colorado, 61 Econ. Geography 3
(1985).
7. See H. Burness & J. Quirk, Water Law, Water Transfers, and Economic Efficiency: The Colorado River, 23 J. Law and Econ. 111 (1980).
8. See, e.g., D. Bromley et al., Water Reform and Economic Development: InstitutionalAspects of
Water Management in the Developing Countries, 28 J. Econ. Dev. and Cultural Change 365
(1980); E. Checchio & B. Colby, Refining the Water Process: Innovations for Western States, in
Water Marketing: The Move to Innovation (S. Shupe ed., 1988); K. Frederick & J. Hanson,
Water for Western Agriculture (1982); C. Howe et al., Innovative Approaches to Water Allocation:
The PotentialforWater Markets, 22 Water Res. Research 439 (1986); J.Quiggin, Privateand Common Property Rights in the Economics of the Environment, 22 J. Econ. Issues 1071 (1988); Young,
supranote 2.
9. See B. Colby, TransactionsCosts and Efficiency in Western Water Allocation, 72 Am. J. Agric.
Econ. 1184 (1990): B. Colby, EnhancingInstream Flow Benefits in an Era of Water Marketing, 26
Water Res. Research 1113 (1990); B. Saliba, Do WaterMarkets 'Work'? Market Transfers and TradeOffs in the Southwestern States, 23 Water Res. Research 1113 (1987); Frederick & Hanson, supra
note 8; R. Howitt & H. Vaux, Jr., Water Trading and Efficiency Criteria in Californiain Transfer-
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Young notes that:
in spite of ... measured optimism... it appears in too

many cases that an overly large difference in the value
in alternative uses is required in order to precipitate
10
transactions as a solution to water supply problems.
Micha Gisser and Ronald N. Johnson advocate the limitation of
water transfers to consumptive use to minimize the third party impacts
resulting from return flows.11 The doctrine of beneficial use makes innovation difficult and results in inefficient water use. 12 Kathleen A. Miller
argues from empirical evidence that restrictions by irrigation organizations on the transfer of water outside the organization by individual members, while the organizations per13se engage in such transfers, may be
consistent with efficient water use.
The Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District has a large
number of potential water traders including industrial, municipal and
agricultural users. The district has some particular attributes which have
facilitated the development of water rental and transfer markets within
it.

14

Other studies of the district and its markets include works by
Raymond L. Anderson; Bonnie Colby Saliba and David Bush; Richard L.
Gardner and Thomas A. Miller; L.M. Hartman and Don Seastone; and
Arthur Maass and Raymond L. Anderson. 15 Colby Saliba and Bush also
explain the detailed workings, including the legal settings, of the northern
16
Colorado water markets as well as others existing in the Southwest.
They further address the valuation of water rights by those markets
including their roles in mitigating risk and promoting economic growth,
as well as the efficiency and equity of the market allocations. On her own,
ability of Water Entitlements Seminar and Workshop (J. Pigram & B. Hooper eds., 1990)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of New England Centre for Water Policy Research); L. MacDonnell, Transferring Water to Higher Uses, Presented at the American
Ass'n of Civil Engineers Conference on Water Resources for the Future: The Management
Challenge (May 1989).
10. R. Young, Why Are There So Few Transactionsamong Water Uses? 68 Am. J. Agric. Econ.
1143,1150 (1986).
11. See M. Gisser & R. Johnson, InstitutionalRestrictions on the Transfer of Water Rights and
the Survival of an Agency, in Water Rights: Scarce Resource Allocation, Bureaucracy and the
Environment (T. Anderson ed., 1983).
12. See T. Tregarthen, Water in Colorado: Fear and Loathing of the Market Place, in Water
Rights: Scarce Resource Allocation, Bureaucracy and the Environment, supra note 11.
13. K. Miller, The Right to Use Versus the Right to Sell: Spillover Effects and Constraintson the
Water Rights of IrrigationOrganizationMembers, 23 Water Res. Research 2166 (1987).
14. See Anderson, supra note 1; Frederick & Hanson, supra note 8; C. Howe et al., Innovative
Approaches to Water Management: Lessons from the Colorado-BigThompson Project and Northern
Colorado Water Conservancy District, in Scarce Water and Institutional Change (K. Frederick
ed., 1986).
15. See Anderson, supra note 1; B. Saliba & D. Bush, Water Markets in Theory and Practice:
Market Transfers, Water Values and Public Policy ch. 5 (1987); R. Gardner & T. Miller, Price
Behavior in the Water Market of NortheasternColorado, 19 Water Res. Bull. 557 (1983); Hartman
& Seastone, supra note 1, at ch. 5; Maass & Anderson, supranote 1, at ch. 7.
16. Saliba & Bush, supra note 15.
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Colby Saliba covers similar ground before concluding:
This research indicates that we are a long way from
being able to understand and quantify benefits and
costs associated with water markets and alternative
transfer policies in order to determine how and to
be governed and
what extent market outcomes should
17
circumscribed by public policy.
Concerning California specifically, Henry J. Vaux observes that:
[tihere is no direct evidence to indicate how much
Kern County might benefit from marketlike institutions that facilitate trade. It can be argued inferentially
from existing information that markets would result in
more efficient use of water in Kern County and could
make additional supplies of water available for agriculture. Whether such markets can be developed is
another question, however, since there are a host18of
institutional barriers to market exchanges of water.
Richard W. Wahl and Robert K. Davis consider whether or not
property rights allow Colorado River water to be marketed between irrigation districts in southern California. 19 Richard E. Howitt and Henry J.
Vaux contend that regulations preventing water agencies from making
profits on water sales substantially reduce the amount of water traded. 23u
Extending the earlier work of John C. Flinn and John W.B.
Guise,2 1 which in turn had modified the T. Takyama and George C. Judge
approach, 22 Vaux and Howitt demonstrate that interregional trade mod23
els can be used to assess the benefits from interregional water trading.
Vaux and Howitt distinguish their approach from the earlier interbasin
work of Charles Howe and K. William Easter; Maurice M. Kelso, William
E. Martin, and Lawrence E. Mack; and Ronald Cummings, which considbetween basins and the alternative investments
ered discrete transfers
24
between them.
A number of other specific issues related to water marketing are
addressed in the literature. The works of Sotirios Angelides and Eugene
17. B. Saliba, supranote 9.
18. H. Vaux, Jr., Water Scarcity and Gains from Trade in Kern County, California, in Scarce
Water and Institutional Change, supra note 14.
19. .R. Wahl & R. Davis, Satisfying Southern California'sThirstfor Water: Efficient Alternatives,
in Scarce Water and Institutional Change, supranote 14.
20. Howitt & Vaux, supra note 9.
21. J.Flinn & J.Guise, An Application of Spatial EquilibriumAnalysis to Water Resource Allocation, 6 Water Res. Research 398 (1970).
22. T. Takyama & G. Judge, Spatial Equilibriumand QuadraticProgramming,46J. Farm Econ.

67 (1964).
23. H. Vaux, Jr. & R. Howitt, Managing Water Scarcity: An Evaluationof InterregionalTrans-

fers, 20 Water Res. Research 785 (1984).

24. Howe & Easter, supranote 1; Kelso et al., supra note 1; R. Cummings, Interbasin Water
Transfers: A Case Study in Mexico (1974).
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Bardach; Kenneth Frederick and James Hanson; and Richard L. Gardner 25
all discuss water banking, which is a means of trading water through a

government agency-a water bank-on a short-term basis without renters forfeiting water under the prior appropriation doctrine. The works of
Ad Michelsen and Robert A. Young; and Steven J. Schupe, Gary D. Weatherford and Elizabeth Checchio 26 both consider 'dry-year options' which
are long-term arrangements allowing cities to use irrigators' water during
droughts. An article written by Robert A. Young, John T. Faubert and J.
Morel-Seytoux 2 7 considers alternatives before favoring a quasi-market
system of stream-aquifer interrelationships, but its workability requires
an adequate supply of upstream reservoir water to which groundwater
users have market access. The works of Terry L. Anderson and Ronald N.

Johnson; and Marie Leigh Livingston and Thomas A. Miller 28 are concerned with the effect of general instream rights on the transfer of water
between traditional users whereas Walter Butcher, Philip R. Wandschnei-

der and Norman K. Whittlesey; and Kathleen A. Miller2 focus on hydropower generation as the instream use in the Pacific Northwest. Others are
concerned with market transfers of water between hydropower genera31

30
tion and irrigation in that area. Elizabeth Checchio and Bonnie Colby
believe that both private and state agencies should be allowed to acquire
water rights for instream flow maintenance. Focusing on subsidized
Bureau of Reclamation water, Richard W. Wahl recommends that efficiency be promoted by making rights more secure and fostering water
marketing with existing subsidies in place, rather than pursuing the his-

torically unsuccessful task of removing the subsidies from water
charges. 32 Two recent developments with the potential to impact dramat25. S. Angelides & E. Bardach, Water Banking: How to Stop Wasting Agricultural Water
(1978); Frederick & Hanson, supranote 8; R. Gardner, A Beginningfor a Water Market, in Water
Values and Markets: Emerging Management Tools (1986) (special report of the Freshwater
Foundation).
26. A. Michelson & R. Young, Economics of Optioning Agricultural Water Rightsfor Urban
Water Supplies During Droughts,in Transferability of Water Entitlements Seminar and Workshop, supra note 9; S. Shupe et al., Western Water Rights: The Era of Reallocation, 29 Nat. Res. J.
413 (1989).
27. R. Young et al., Evaluating InstitutionalAlternativesfor Managingan InterrelatedStreamAquifer System, 69 Am. J. Agric. Econ. 787 (1986).
28. T. Anderson & R. Johnson, The Problem of Instream Flows, 24 Econ. Inquiry. 535 (1986);
M. Livingston and T. Miller, A Frameworkfor Analyzing the Impact of Western Instream Water
Rights on Choice Domains: Transferability,Externalities,and Consumptive Use, 62 Land Econ. 269
(1986).
29. W. Butcher et al., Competition between Irrigationand Hydropower in the PacificNorthwest,
in Scarce Water and Institutional Change, supra note 14; K. Miller, Climate Change: Water
Rights and Electric Utilities,1989 Energy Pol'y 420; K. Miller, Water, Electricity,and Institutional
Innovation, in Climate Change and U.S. Water Resources (P. Waggoner ed., 1990).
30. See, e.g., J. Hamilton et al., InterruptibleWater Markets in the Pacfic Northwest, 71 Am. J.
Agric. Econ. 63 (1989); N. Whittlesey and J. Houston, Water Markets for Stream Flow Augmentation, Presented to the Symposium for the American Water Resource Ass'n (June 1984).
31. Checchio & Colby, supra note 8.
32. R. Wahl, Markets for Federal Water: Subsidies, Property Rights and the Bureau of Reclamation (1989).
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States relate to groundically on water transfers in the western United
33
water and Indian reservation water rights.
In Australia, Bruce Davidson and Allan J. Randall each consider
water marketing, 34 as do the more recent papers of John J. Pigram and
Warren F. Musgrave; and Andrew K. Dragun and Victor Gleeson. 35 In
Israel, Ezra Sadan and Ruth Ben-Zvi indicate the low cost of market and
marketlike institutional alternatives relative to new resource development. 36 The works of Ronald Hide; and Walter Moore and Murray
Arthur-Worsop discuss aspects of the move toward water marketing in
New Zealand. 7 The long history of water marketing
in Spain is detailed
38
Anderson.
L.
Raymond
and
Maass
by Arthur
Terry L. Anderson, Oscar R. Burt and David T. Fractor discuss,
and illustrate with a case study, the concept of privatizing groundwater by
granting individual users rights to both stocks and flows, and making
such rights transferable. 39 Hence private users incur the full opportunity
costs of their actions. This is privatizing the resource, which is distinct
from privatizing previously public water supply authorities as done in
England and Wales4 and being considered in Australia.41

33. See D. Brookshire et al., Current Issues in the Quantification of Federal Reserved Water
Rights, 21 Water Res. Research 1777 (1985); R. Cummings, The Contemporary Settingfor Water
Management in the West: An Overview,21 Water Res. Research 1749 (1985); S. Deloria, A Native
American View of Western Water Development, 21 Water Res. Research 1785 (1985); C. DuMars,
The State as a Participantin Water Markets: Appropriate Roles for Congress and the Courts, 21
Water Res. Research 1771 (1985); C. DuMars & A. Tarlock, Symposium Introduction:New Challenges to State Water Allocation Sovereignty, 29 Nat. Res. J. 331 (1989); M. Moore, The Bureau of
Reclamation'sNew MandateforIrrigationWater Conservation:Purposesand Policy Alternatives, 27
Water Res. Research 145 (1991); A. Tarlock, An Overview of the Law of GroundwaterManagement, 21 Water Res. Research 1751 (1985); A. Utton, Alternatives and Uncertaintiesin Interstate
GroundwaterLaw, 21 Water Res. Research 1767 (1985).
34. B. Davidson, Australia: Wet or Dry? (1969); A. Randall, PropertyEntitlementsand Pricing
Policiesfora Maturing Water Economy, 25 Austl. J. Agric. Econ. 195 (1981).
35. J. Pigram & W. Musgrave, Transferability of Water Entitlements in Australia, Presented
at the Annual Meeting of Universities Council on Water Resources (Aug. 1989); A. Dragun &
V. Gleeson, From Water Law to Transferabilityin New South Wales, 29 Nat. Res. J. 645 (1989).
36. E. Sadan & R. Ben-Zvi, The Value of InstitutionalChange in Israel's Water Economy, 23
Water Res. Research 1 (1987).
37. R. Hide, Property Rights and Natural Resource Policy, Lincoln University Centre for
Resource Management Studies in Resource Management (Canterbury, New Zealand) No. 3,
1987; W Moore & M. Arthur-Worsop, Privatizing Water: An Analysis of Initiatives to Sell
Community Irrigation Schemes and to Create Water Markets, Presented at the Annual Conference of the New Zealand Branch of the Australian Agricultural Economics Society (June
1989).
38. Maass & Anderson, supra note 1.
39. T. Anderson et al., PrivatizingGroundwaterBasins: A Model and its Applications, in Water
Rights: Scarce Resource Allocation, Bureaucracy and the Environment (T. Anderson ed.,

1983).
40. See D. Parker & W. Sewell, Evolving Water Institutionsin England and Wales: An Assessment of Two Decades of Experience, 28 Nat. Res. J. 751 (1988).
41. See H. Mulligan, Private Sector Involvement in the Irrigation Industry, (University of
New England Centre for Water Policy Research Occasional Paper. No. 6, 1990).
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A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO THE
COMMON PROPERTY LITERATURE
Quite a large body of literature has arisen on the desirability of
common property instead of private or state property in natural resource
management. The economic discussion is led by writings which would fit
42
Allan J. Randall's institutional/land economics (I/LE) classification.
Conception Cruz; Christopher Gibbs and Daniel W. Bromley; and John
Quiggin provide further examples of such writings. 43 Other prominent
contributors in the wider literature are anthropologists and human ecologists as well as geographers, and political and environmental scientists.
There are a number of reasons for this renewed interest. A chief
reason among economists is the dissatisfaction with the belief that common property is synonymous with open access, as further discussed
below. Some economists also see common property as a way of promoting
community and reducing conflict in some complex systems, and as an
equitable and efficient way of achieving sustainable resource use, especially under uncertainty.45 Scholars from other disciplines are interested in
common property for a number of reasons including the breakdown of
traditional common property resource management as a factor in environmental degradation in developing countries; 46 as a means of nurturing
degraded ecosystems back to productive states;4 7 because of the "newfound pride in traditional values and institutions, both in the Third World
and in the West," 48 and because of the increasing realization that common
property has been the means by which many natural resources have been
traditionally maintained on a sustainable basis for a very long time.49
42. See A. Randall, Methodology, Ideology, and the Economics of Policy: Why Resource Economists Disagree,67 Am. J. Agric. Econ. 1022 (1985).
43. C. Cruz, Wateras Common Property;The Case of IrrigationWater Rights in the Philippines,
in Common Property Resources: Ecology and Community-based Sustainable Development
(F. Berkes ed., 1989); C. Gibbs & D. Bromley, InstitutionalArrangementsforManagement of Rural
Resources: Common-PropertyRegimes, in Common Property Resources: Ecology and Community-based Sustainable Development, id.; Quiggin, supranote 8.
44. Quiggin, supra note 8.
45. Gibbs & Bromley, supra note 43.
46. See R. Goodland et al., Meeting Environmental Concerns Caused by Common-PropertyMismanagement in Economic Development Projects, in Common Property Resources: Ecology and
Community-based Sustainable Development 150, supra note 43.
47. See H. Regier et al., Reforming the Use of Natural Resources, in Common Property
Resources: Ecology and Community-based Sustainable Development 110, supranote 43.
48. See F Berkes & M. Farvar, Introduction and Overview to Common Property Resources:
Ecology and Cogimunity-based Sustainable Development 3, supranote 43; see also B. McCay
& J. Acheson, Human Ecology of the Commons, in The Question of the Commons: The Culture
and Ecology of Communal Resources 25 (B. McCay & J. Acheson eds., 1987).
49. See, e.g., A. Grima & F Berkes, NaturalResources: Access, Rights-to-Use and Management,
in Common Property Resources: Ecology and Community-based Sustainable Development
51, supra note 43; McCay & Acheson, supra note 48, at 14-15; S. Sutton, The Falajw-A Traditional
Co-operativeSystem of Water Management, in Community Water Development 268 (C. Kerr ed.,
1989).
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The literature can be divided broadly into concerns with international, global commons and concerns with local, regional and national
commons. The World Conservation Strategy, a report of the World Commission on Environment and Development, and the work of Boulding
address the former concern, 50 while this paper more closely addresses the
latter. A recurring theme in this literature on common property is that
mainstream 'property rights economists' have made a fundamental error
by confusing common property with open access. 51 In other words, the
have followed Garrett Hardin's "tragedy of the commons" approachz
and paid too little attention to S. Ciracy-Wantrup and Richard Bishop's
observation that "common property... implies that potential resource
users who are not members of a group of co-equal owners are
excluded." 53 This recurring theme implies that too much has been made
of the tendency for common property resource management to fail under
external pressures,54 as well as abuses from within, 55 and too little consideration has been given to factors resulting in their sustainability. Robert
Wade discusses factors which increase the likelihood of successful collective action. 56 The above cited literature examines a range of specific types
of natural resources being managed as common property. The authors do
not see common property as a panacea. Some hope to develop a theory of
why and under what conditions common property management continues, fails, occurs and re-occurs, replaces and is replaced by state and pri50. See World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future
(1987); see also K. Boulding, Commons and Community: The Idea of a Public, in Managing the
Commons (G. Hardin & J. Baden eds., 1977).
51. See e.g., D. Bromley, Common PropertyIssues In International Development, 5 Devs. 12
(1985); C. Dahlman, The Open Field System and Beyond: A Property Rights Analysis of an
Economic Institution (1980); McCay & Acheson, supranote 48, at ch. 1; Quiggin, supranote 8;
C. Runge, Common PropertyExternalities:Isolation, Assurance,and Resource Depletionin a Traditional GrazingContext, 63 Am. J.Agric. Econ. 595 (1981); M. Taylor, The Possibility of Cooperation 26 (1987). However, just what constitutes closed or reduced access, in contrast to open
access, is not abundantly clear, at least in the case of water resources. Presumably it means no
access to new users without acquiring rights. Quiggin, supra note 8, makes the point, implicit
in Ciriacy-Wantrup & Bishop, supra note 6, that it also implies upper bounds on access by
existing users. But such upper bounds would need to be flexible in water resources subject to
fluctuating supplies and demands, especially when private water storage facilities are available to users at their point of use. If, instead of such flexibility, users had constant upper limits
on quantity used in, say, each week of a season, in droughts each user would seek access to
the limited supplies to convert water from a common property resource in the headworks
reservoir to a private property resource in their soil and, in the case of many irrigators in the
uncertain Australian environment, in their large on-farm water storage facilities. This is
wasteful because it converts water from low-loss to high-loss storage.
52. G.Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243 (1968).
53. Ciriacy-Wantrup & Bishop, supra note 6, at 715.
54. F. Berkes, Cooperationfrom the Perspective of Human Ecology, in Common Property
Resources: Ecology and Community-based Sustainable Development, supranote 43.
55. Quiggin, supra note 8.
56. R. Wade, Village Republics: Economic Conditions for Collective Action in South India
(1988); R. Wade, The Management of Common PropertyResources: Findinga CooperativeSolution,
2 World Bank Res. Observer 219 (1987).
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vate property But most examine single natural resources in particular
historical, cultural and geographical settings. 57 Perhaps the best overview
of the literature is given in the following quote from Bonnie McCay and
James M. Acheson:
By equating common property with open access, the
tragedy-of-the-commons approach ignores important
social institutions and their roles in managing the commons. Moreover, its policy solutions-government
intervention and privatization-can weaken or demolish existing institutions and
58 worsen or even create
tragedies of the commons.

57. One of the most cited works is that of R. Netting, Balancing On an Alp: Ecological
Change and Community in a Swiss Mountain Community (1981), who left anthropological
research in Africa in favor of a Swiss alpine community, largely because of the detailed historical data available. He writes "By 1473 the community was regulating its affairs by written
statute ....
An important regulation of alp rights in 1517... laid down the principle that 'no
one is permitted to send more cows to the alps than he can winter,' This made the number of
animals sent to the communal summer pasture directly dependent on the amount of hay and
thus the meadow area possessed by each cattle owner ....The alp could not, in theory, be
overgrazed, because stocking was limited to the fixed number of animals that could be provendered from a bounded village territory. At one stroke this simple rule overturns the economic logic of the 'tragedy of the commons.' The Torbel rule was given teeth by the provision
for one official.., to be chosen yearly... [with the] ... authority to fine anyone who exceeded
his quota at the high rate of two pounds per horse, one pound per cow, and five shillings per
sheep .... Half the fine was kept by the official 'for his work'. In 1971 similar penalties were
exacted. The most detailed rules for internal order were those in 24 statutes written on parchment and dated April 17, 1531." Netting, supra, at 60-62. After closing the community to
immigration, the population was controlled by strict mores. "The closed community of Torbel maintained a level of vigilance on its members that militated against any clandestine sexual activity. From the small windows of the black log houses there.., is no movement on the
paths or across the meadows that cannot be identified both as to who it is and what they are
doing. It is instantly known whether or not the person can possibly have business in that
place at that time of day.... In this sense privacy is the enemy of the moral community, and
the Torbel of times past trusted its members no father than it could see them." Id. at 134. For
recent comprehensive case studies by economists, see N. Jodha, Rural Common Property
Resources: Contribution and Crisis, 25 Econ. & Pol. Wkly A65 (1990); and Wade, supra note 56.
58. McCay & Acheson, supra note 48, at 34. The language used by McCay and Acheson
refers to G. Hardin's classic article "The Tragedy of the Commons," supra note 52. It may
appear that Hardin was inferring that all common property resources will end up in tragic
open-access situations. However, the title of his article, "The Tragedy of the Commons," and
the use of that phrase in his paper, is really an abbreviation for "The Tragedy of Freedom in a
Commons," which is the title of a key section in his paper. He wrote, "Ruin is the destination
toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in
the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all." Hardin, supra note
52, at 1244. Hence he was writing about tragedy in those commons free from effective rules
governing behavior, including entry, rather than claiming that all common property resources
are destined for the tragedy which such freedom brings. For a discussion of those types of collective action to which limit such freedom, see E. Ostrom, The Origins of Institutions for Collective Action in Commonpool Resource Situations (Indiana University-Bloomington,
Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis Working Paper No. 14,1985).
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CAPACITY SHARING (CS)
At the outset it is useful to distinguish between the development
of property rights to water in Australia, where the concept of CS originated, and in the western United States which is prominent in the movement toward water marketing. In the western United States, a large and
viable irrigation industry, holding property rights to unregulated streamflows, was firmly established before large dams were built to increase
usable supplies. The generally more arid climate in Australia made it
obvious that major headwork dams would have to precede significant irrigation. Hence, in Australia water rights grew up around regulated water
supplies; in the western United States the construction of large dams
caused relatively minor adjustments to existing rights. Australian water
rights are mostly defined in terms of stored water whereas in the western
United States they are mostly defined in terms of pre-regulated streamflows. Thus Capacity Sharing is developing in Australia to aid in the management of water systems in which the operation of water storage is
paramount.
In terms of irrigation system decisionmaking, there are really two
Australias; one lies in the predominantly winter rainfall zone in the higher
latitudes, and one covers the predominantly uniform and summer rainfall
zones in the lower latitudes.5 9 Given the usual 'summer drought' in the
winter rainfall zone, once the pre-planting irrigation is applied, there is
virtually no uncertainty about either demand or supply for the immediate
year. Uncertainty is essentially limited to supply in later years. Known
supply and demand for the immediate season permits the use of deterministic, season-long, computer-based operations research methods, such
as simulation or linear programming models, with a high degree of confidence.
In great contrast, in the summer and uniform rainfall zones of the
lower latitudes, both supply and demand for irrigation water remain
highly stochastic or uncertain at the time water use decisions are made.
This means that stochastic, short time-step decision models for water
users are required in place of the deterministic, season-long time-step
models sufficient for the higher latitudes. Decisionmaking is further complicated in this environment by serial correlation in both supply and
demand, and cross-correlation between them.
Although these complications add considerably to the complexity
of the models and data required in the lower latitudes, further complexity
arises because supply-side and demand-side subsystems should not be
59. N. Dudley, Alternative InstitutionalArrangementsfor Water Supply ProbabilitiesandTransfers, in Transferability of Water Entitlements Seminar and Workshop (J.Pigram & B. Hooper
eds., 1990) (unpublished manuscript, available from the University of New England Centre
for Water Policy Research).
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modeled separately. There is a great deal of interaction between supplyside and demand-side decisions in the lower latitudes. Demand for water
is conditioned by the users' perceptions of the reliability with which supplies fluctuating through time will match their fluctuating demands. For
example, users may respond to a perception of unreliable supply by modifying crops planted and maintained under irrigation in times of shortage;
modifying construction and operation of on-farm water storage facilities
which are commonplace in the lower latitudes in Australia; and modifying areas and methods of leveling land, or channeling or recirculating
water.
Each of these modifications in turn affects the demand-reliability
preferences of users which the supply authority tries to accommodate by
changing reservoir storage carryover strategies. That is, supply management, and the resulting probability that supplies will be sufficient for
demands, is conditioned by the supplier's perception of the users' reliability preferences. 60 This means that there are difficulties or problems of
coordination and communication between the supply-side and demandside decisionmakers. These problems apply both in real life and when
modeling to aid decisionmaking.
One approach to overcome these coordination and communication problems, and to indicate what is optimally achievable using the
water resources of a river valley, is to assume that one decisionmaker controls both supply-side and demand-side decisions in a system with a nonlimiting distribution system capacity. This approach internalizes the
coordination and communication decisions and jointly optimizes the reservoir and farm management and planning decisions to maximize
expected regional net revenue from water use. Even so, a hierarchy of
decisions remain: within-season and beginning season system operation
decisions need to be optimized before long-term planning decisions about
reservoir and distribution system capacities, and size of area to be serviced, can be optimized. At first, a suite of computer simulation and
dynamic programming models was used 61 to develop this approach
before it was simplified by using a larger-dimension dynamic programming model. 62
60. G. Kaine-Jones & Y.Simpson, A Cluster Analysis of Cotton Planting Strategies in the
Namoi Valley, Presented at the 34th Annual Conference of the Australian Agricultural Economics Society (Feb. 12-15,1989); N. Dudley, Volume Sharing of Reservoir Water, 24 Water Res.
Research 641 (1988).
61. N. Dudley, A Single Decision-MakerApproach to Irrigation Reservoir and Farm Management Decision Making, 24 Water Res. Research 633 (1988); N. Dudley, IrrigationPlanning 4:
Optimal InterseasonalWater Allocation, 8 Water Res. Research 586 (1972); N. Dudley et al., Optimal Intra-seasonalWater Allocation, 7 Water Res. Research 770 (1971); N. Dudley, Irrigation
Planning2: ChoosingOptimal Acreages within a Season, 7 Water Res. Research 1051 (1971); N.
Dudley et al., Irrigation Planning3: The Best Size of IrrigationAreafor a Reservoir,8 Water Res.
Research 7 (1972).
62. N. Dudley &0. Burt, StochasticReservoir Managementand System Designfor Irrigation,9
Water Res. Research 507 (1973).
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The first attempt to progress from one to multiple decisionmakers
involved one reservoir manager interacting with multiple but identical
irrigation decisionmakers, each trying to maximize expected net revenue.
However, under this scheme, the regional expected net revenue fell below
that of the single decisionmaker system because communication and coordination problems existed between the reservoir managers and the irriga63
tors.
CS provides for multiple decisionmakers while keeping coordination and communication problems internalized within one decisionmaking entity. Each user has secure, long-term title to a percentage share
in the capacity or empty space of the reservoir and a percentage share of
its inflows as well as reservoir losses. As noted above, it is as though each
user has their own small reservoir on their own small stream. This gives
users with varying degrees of risk aversion the flexibility to manage their
individual sub-systems in accordance with their specific income stability
requirements with much less interference from the behavior of other
water users and reservoir managers than exists with centralized reservoir
management. 64 The extent to which there are non-market interactions
between the users under CS could depend on the climatic environment in
which the system is located, although this interaction was found
to be
65
negligible in the environmental setting of Dudley and Musgrave.
CS was developed so irrigators could allocate their own water
through time so as to satisfy their individual supply sufficiency requirements in a highly uncertain environment without interference from other
water users or reservoir managers. Allowing water stored in the users'
shares of reservoir capacity to be transferred through the market confronts
users with the full opportunity costs of water.
Dudley and Musgrave 66 illustrate CS with an example in which
25 percent of the water users are risk neutral whereas each of three other
63. Dudley, supra note 61.
64. N. Dudley & W. Musgrave, Capacity Sharingof Water Reservoirs, 24 Water Res. Research
649 (1988).
65. Under CS, there is no reservoir inflow interaction between shareholders unless voluntary exchange of inflows is engaged in; there is no reservoir storage interaction between
shareholders, apart from very minor storage loss interaction depending on the total volume
stored in the reservoir, until (a) shareholders exchange storage or (b) one shareholder gains
stored water unexpectedly because other shareholders do not sell enough of their stored
water in time to prevent their share of storage 'overflowing' into the storage space of others;
there may or may not be distribution system interactions between shareholders depending
on the nature and capacity of the distribution system. Id. See also N. Dudley, Urban Capacity
Sharing-An Innovative PropertyRight for Maturing Water Economies, 30 Nat. Res. J.381 (1990).
Bringing the distribution system into the models complicates them greatly, but this is currently being pursued by this author. A daily time step simulation model, and a corresponding
dynamic, stochastic optimization model, is being developed to incorporate delivery time lags
of some three weeks, irrigation frequencies of about ten days and on-farm storages in which
to store currently unusable tributary flow water and unwanted reservoir release water
(unwanted because of local rain while the reservoir release is traveling to the point of use).
66. Dudley & Musgrave, supra note 64.
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user groups had different levels of risk aversion. The authors also note
that the CS concept readily extends to multiple purposes such as instream
recreation and environmental uses, flood control and urban uses as well as
irrigation. Each of these purposes could be represented by a user group
controlling a share of reservoir capacity and inflows. This represents 'first
level' CS. Some user groups, such as flood control, may always operate
their shares as a single unit. But, for other users, there are many ways in
which each group's inflows and stored water can be suballocated to group
users. Final users, those who use water as a private or rival good, such as
irrigators and urban users, may in turn control shares in the reservoir
capacity and inflows allocated to the larger group to which they belong.
This represents 'second level' CS. Not all members of the group would be
required to control individual shares themselves. For example, half of the
irrigators may continue to use half the group's share in the traditional way
while the other members would engage in (second level) CS and control
their own shares. Similarly, only some industrial users may choose to be
final shareholders while the rest receive water in the traditional way, and
many private urban consumers would receive water allocated to them
of the urban share of reservoir capacity and inflows in
from the remainder 67
the traditional way.
There could be more than two levels of CS. For example, the total
urban share of a multi-purpose system (first level) could be subdivided
into a number of shares, each controlled by a smaller urban authority (second level), who could then retail water to final consumers in a traditional
way or by final user (third level) CS. 68 The number of users wishing to be
final shareholders could expand over time as familiarity with the concept
grows, although details of how existing group storage contents would be
allocated at the time would need to be worked out. Note that the longterm rights held by CS users may not amount to private ownership of the
resource, but may be a perpetual or long-term lease with sufficient security of tenure to result in efficient resource allocation.
To conclude this introduction to CS, note that it was developed to
integrate supply and demand management in highly uncertain environments, and thus promote economically efficient resource allocation. The
stochastic supply/stochastic demand was seen as the general case; shortterm deterministic supply and demand situations are seen as special
cases. But the first fertile ground for CS at an applied level was a special
case area, as discussed in the following.

67. Dudley, supra note 65.
68. Id.
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TAKING ROOT IN VICTORIA
Even before the first publication on CS, the concept was conveyed
to the Director General of the Department of Water Resources in Victoria,
Australia, economist Dr. John Paterson. 6 9 He quickly appreciated that CS
provides a non-attenuated property right for water by a necessary
"exhaustive partitioning of the resource among title holders ... [which]
...can be achieved only at the [resource] source.' 70 He and his staff examined the feasibility of the concept for Victoria. 7 1 They generally favored CS
over the existing alternative-release sharing. Paterson distinguished
between them as follows:
Release sharingdefines entitlements in terms of delivered
water with a given volume and reliability. The owner/
operatorof the storage decides what amount is available
for release in the light of circumstances, and what prudential carry-over is required to meet the obligation of
the operator.Capacity-sharingallocates explicit shares of
storage capacity, inflow, losses, and hence stored
water, to end users, each of whom decides, in regard to
their own respective shares, what amount
is available
72
for release, and what to carry over.
Warren M. Musgrave, Chris Alaoze, and Norman J.
Dudley 73 show algebraically that CS is at least as good
as release sharing in achieving an efficiency objective
in the predominantly winter rainfall environment
where 'supply reliability' remains a useful concept,
and does not need to be replaced by 'supply sufficiency reliability' which is relevant in the lower lati74
tudes, as indicated above and discussed in Dudley.
69. N. Dudley & W. Musgrave, Property Rights and Capacity Sharing of Water Resources,
Presented at the 30th Annual Conference of the Australian Agricultural Economics Society
(Feb. 1986).
70. J.Paterson, Rationalized Law and Well-Defined Water Rights for Improved Water Resource
Management, in Renewable Natural Resources: Economic Incentives for Improved Management 48 (OECD, ed., 1989).
71. C. Alaoze, A Dynamic Programming Demonstration of the Optimality of Capacity
Sharing over Release Sharing as a Method of Allocating Entitlements to Bulk Water in Shared
Reservoir Systems (Victorian Dep't of Water Resources Staff Paper No. 8,1988) (unpublished
manuscript, available from Victorian Dep't of Water Resources, Australia); Dep't of Water
Resources, Security for Major Water Allocations: Background Report (Water Resources Management Series Report No. 8., 1987) (unpublished manuscript, available from Victorian Government Printing Office, Melbourne).
72. J.Paterson, supranote 70, at 51.
73. W. Musgrave et al., Capacity Sharingand its Implicationsfor System Reliability,in Proceedings of the National Workshop on Planning and Management of Water Resource Systems:
Risk and Reliability (G. Dandy &A. Simpson, eds., 1989) (Australian Water Resources Council Series No. 17) (unpublished manuscript, available from Australian Gov't Publication Service, Canberra). See also Alaoze, supranote 71.
74. Dudley, supranote 59.
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After discussing the complexities that arise in introducing CS,
John Paterson concludes:
In Victoria, Australia, we hope to obtain enabling
legislation which permits the old and debased coinage
of releases to be translated into the new currency of
transferable capacity shares. Statutory safeguards and
saving provisions are proposed to confirm the negotiating base of existing right holders. The rate of (voluntary) uptake of the new instrument of allocation can
only be guessed at. There are currently enough supply
authorities with exposed positions to offer a high probability that some immediate use will be made of the
new provisions.75
This hope has since become a reality with the passing of a new act
governing the use of water by the Victorian state parliament.
DISTINGUISHING FEATURES OF CAPACITY SHARING
Although aspects of the nature and implementation of CS are still
evolving, such as the recent addition of percentage sharing of below-dam
tributary flows to the river when it serves as delivery channel, 77 CS possesses some distinguishing characteristics. The term Capacity Sharing is
really an abbreviation chosen to highlight the proportional sharing of one
or more reservoirs in a water resources supply system among users or
groups of users who store their share of inflows according to their aversion to risk. To preserve the analogy that CS allows each shareholder to
have their own small reservoir on their own small stream to operate as
they choose with a minimum of interference, streamflows above and
below the reservoir are also shared proportionately. Hence, a more
descriptive but cumbersome term would be "proportional sharing of
streamflows (reservoir inflows and downstream tributary flows) and proportional sharing of active reservoir storage capacity in which share holders can store their share of inflows according to their risk preferences."
POTENTIAL ROLE OF CAPACITY SHARING
WITH PRIVATE AND COMMON PROPERTY
This section discusses 1) the compatibility of CS and private property in water resource systems; 2) the compatibility of CS and common
property in water resource systems; and 3) the compatibility of CS, private
75. Paterson, supra note 70, at 60.
76. Water Act of 1989, Vict. Acts No. 80.
77. Dudley, supra note 59.
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and common property in water resource systems. Private property is
equated in the following discussion with the market allocation of
resources.
COMPATIBILITY OF CAPACITY SHARING
AND MARKET ALLOCATION
To make efficient short- and intermediate-term management decisions, including decisions about trading water, users must have confidence in their information on the probabilities of supply. Users match the
probability of supply with the probability of demand in a decisionmaking
process to determine the likelihood of going broke, the suitability of their
cash flow path over time, and other eventualities. Other things being
equal, the greater the uncertainty about the probabilities of supply and
demand, the less likely efficient decisions will emerge. Ronald Heiner
argues that increasing the uncertainty and complexity of problems will
lead decisionmakers to resort to rules which restrict their behavior to a
"limited repertoire of actions" instead of optimizing decisions from the
total set of options available. 78 For efficient long-term decisions, including
decisions about trading in water rights, users need secure tenure to rights
for which the probabilities of supply will be unaffected by human intervention throughout the users' planning horizons without sufficient com79
pensation.
CS satisfies these security requirements by granting shareholders,
whether individuals or groups, secure long-term rights to a known percentage of inflows into a known percentage of active reservoir storage
capacity, plus a known proportion of downstream tributary flows, if relevant. Using only reservoir inflow probabilities, shareholders can detertheir supplies since there is virtually no
mine the probabilities of receiving
80
interference from others.
Thus CS gives both buyers and sellers a high degree of confidence
in what is being traded. Water may be traded in the short term as a fixed
quantity already in storage or as a future probable streamflow, or a combination of both.81 Similarly, CS provides an excellent basis for trading long
term water rights of known probabilities because of the long-term title
security. Dudley82 argues that other institutional arrangements for allocat78. R. Heiner, The Origin ofPredictableBehavior, 73 Am. Econ. Rev. 560 (1983); R. Heiner, The
Originof PredictableBehavior: FurtherModeling and Applications, 75 Am. Econ. Rev. 391 (1985).
79. Dudley, supra note 59.
80. Dudley & Musgrave, supra note 64.
81. An individual shareholder would, ceteris paribus, value water less as their reservoir
share contents approaches its maximum level (i.e. the capacity of their reservoir share) since
any water in excess of the maximum is lost to that individual shareholder unless sold beforehand or some extra storage can be obtained temporarily. Dudley, supra note 59.
82. Id.
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ing water require information in addition to streamflow probabilities, and
that the nature of the extra information reduces the shareholders confidence in their water supply probabilities and leads to less satisfactory
market outcomes.
Since all distinct water uses from a supply system-including
environmental, flood control and recreation uses-are represented by
shareholdings, market transferability ensures that each use is confronted
with market-generated opportunity costs. Adjustments may be made to
reflect social opportunity costs, but the tradeoffs associated with allocating water to the various uses would be manifest. No one, including governments, could obtain shares of capacity and streamflows without
entering the market and purchasing them from whoever values them
83
least.
Instream user groups are likely to order releases from their reservoir shares only when the sum of other releases traveling the river reach of
concern falls below their target rate. Free-rider problems may emerge if
two or more downstream uses, such as recreation and environmental,
required minimum flows at the same time. This suggests that one shareholder group could provide water for both purposes. Flood controllers,
normally aiming to keep their reservoir share close to empty, may accumulate some water in times of low flood probabilities to sell to other users
before the flood probability increases, thereby providing
some revenue to
84
offset their portion of reservoir operating costs.
Hence, CS is highly compatible with both short- and long-term
market reallocations of water. Constraints may be needed to protect third
parties, as with other market allocation institutional arrangements. The
nonattenuated (explicit, enforceable, exclusive, transferable) nature of the
property rights under CS make it an appropriate institutional arrangement for allocating water rights by market in a new system. 85 Moreover,
CS establishes a basis for the operation of common property subsystems
within large water resource systems, as discussed in the following section.

83. Id.
84. Dudley & Musgrave, supra note 64.
85. On the other hand, an initial nonmarket allocation of shares in reservoir capacity and
streamflows could reflect equity concerns with subsequent marketing being a tool for economically efficient reallocation. In any case, under CS capital recovery, maintenance and
most operating costs of the reservoir and associated works would be levied on users according to their size of shareholdings, rather than volume of water used, which would stabilize
their annual costs and revenue to the dam builder. Dudley, supranote 65.
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COMPATIBILITY OF CAPACITY SHARING
AND COMMON PROPERTY
Cooperative decisions relating to common property are found to
be more durable when the decision making group is relatively small.86
Size per se is not important, but several conditions related to size do affect
the durability of the decisions. McKay and Acheson capture most com87
mentators' sentiments when, summarizing the work of Elinor Ostrom,
they observe that:
[simall-scale communities are more likely to have the
formal conditions required for successful and enduring collective management of the commons. Among
these are the visibility of common resources and
behavior toward them; feedback on the effects of regulations; widespread understanding and acceptance of
rules and their rationales; the values expressed in these
rules (that is, equitable treatment of all and protection
of the environment); and the backing of values
88 by
socialization, standards, and strict enforcement.
Incentives to cooperate can be negative as well as positive. Fikret
Berkes notes that "small communities are not pleasant places for those
who violate local rules and norms of cooperative behavior." 89 Michael
Taylor believes that the most important size effect is the "increased diffi90
culty of conditional cooperation in larger groups."
If effective common property resource management is restricted
to relatively small groups, how are large, modem water resource systems
to be managed? The world's major water resource systems typically cover
large geographic areas, often drawing water from and supplying diverse
political jurisdictions while attempting to satisfy multiple objectives
across a range of multiple uses. Such large systems are often state owned
86. R. Bish, Environmental Resource Management: Public or Private? in Managing the Commons (G. Hardin & J. Baden eds., 1977); K. Bullock and J. Baden, Communes and the Logic on
the Commons, in Managing the Commons, supra;Cruz, supranote 43; M. Gadgil & P Iyer, On
the Diversificationof Common-Property Resource Use by Indian Society, in Common Property
Resources: Ecology and Community-based Sustainable Development, supra note 44; M.
Olson, The Logic of Collective Action 36 (1971); C. Runge, supranote 53; C. Runge, Institutions
and the Free Rider: The Assurance Problem in Collective Action, 46 J. Pol. 154 (1984); R. Wade, The
Management of Common Property Resources: Findinga Cooperative Solution, 2 World Bank Res.
Observer 219 (1987).
87. McCay & Acheson, supra note 48, at 23.
88. Ostrom, supra note 58; M. Olson, The Rudiments of a Revised Theory of the Origins,
Survival, and Performance of Institutions for Collective Action (Indiana University-Bloomington, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis Working Paper No. 32,1985).
89. Berkes, supranote 54, at 85.
90. Taylor, supra note 51, at 12. Conditional cooperation exists where one's cooperation is
conditional on that of other group members. It is required among at least some group members if collective action is to be sustained. Id.
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with sub-systems operating under either private or common propert %
Conception Cruz provides an example of the latter from the Philippines.
Water in the river is called object water and is subject to state control,
whereas diverted water is a 'commodity' subject to a common property
group's set of rules. As water becomes increasingly scarce in most of these
large systems in the future, how is it to be allocated to the various sub-systems?
CS is an appropriate allocation method in these circumstances. To
illustrate, consider a water resources system with a large headworks reservoir on a major river with some downstream tributaries. Water is supplied to a number of relatively small irrigation and village supply subsystems operating under common property rules, and to a large urban
area, downriver from the reservoir. Diversion weirs are in place where
necessary to ensure that each of the groups can divert their portion of river
flows regardless of the total flow. A variable-by-month minimum
instream flow requirement exists for recreation and environmental purposes in the river beyond the furthest downriver diversion. Also, hydropower is generated as a by-product of releases for other purposes. The
reservoir is used for flood control as well.
Under CS, each of the irrigation/village communities, the urban
water authority, the body responsible for instream flow maintenance and
a flood control agency has long-term control of a percentage share in the
active reservoir storage capacity. Although most of these CS shareholders
control percentage shares of reservoir inflows and downstream tributary
flows, the flood control agency may not share either inflows or tributary
flows, thereby increasing shares to the other users. Diverters do not share
in the flow of tributaries which enter the river downstream from their
diversion points since such flows could only be used by them to barter for
water upstream of their diversions.
The essential point is that, once the system is in place, the irrigation/village communities and the urban water center would be able to
operate their shares of reservoir capacity as they choose, and allocate
water within their groups by following their own common property rules
without interference from others. Their behavior continues as long as their
share title security is maintained. The minimum flow authority depends
to some extent on return-to-river flows to maintain instream targets and
save some of their reservoir water. This strategy may involve learning
about quantities, gualities and lags of return flows, so long as the incentive
exists to do so.9 Z Similarly, there is some dynamic interdependence
between the releases of the flood control authority and other users, but CS
91. C. Cruz, supra note 43.

92. If the minimum flows apply to the river above the furthest downstream diversion, the
instream maintenance authority would need to devote more attention to the releases of other
users.
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does not increase these interdependencies relative to alternative institutional arrangements.
Transfers of water and storage rights between shareholders over
time can be by market or by political/administrative processes. Each common property group must arrive at a joint decision on quantities to buy or
sell in the market, or quantities to ask for under political/administrative
allocation. Procedures to protect third parties may be required in both
cases. Market transfer forces each of the shareholders, including common
property groups, to account directly for the opportunity cost of use by
other shareholders, and to compensate the sellers to a degree satisfactory
to them. However, considerable pressure may need to build up in more
traditional societies before transfers of any kind are allowed.
The initial allocation of storage and water rights in an existing
system could preserve the historical allocations as far as practical. This
may result in emerging uses, such as instream flows, receiving a very
small share of the allocated rights, and it may need to be modified to provide for the new uses. If market transactions are permitted, however, public funds can be budgeted to purchase water rights from the common
property groups which value them least and to reallocate those rights to
recently recognized water uses.
Regardless of the method of water transfers, or the extent to
which they are permitted at all, CS provides a means of identifying the
rights to water resources held by each of the common property groups,
facilitating both the management of water by those groups and the transfer of water between them and other users.
COMPATIBILITY OF CAPACITY SHARING,
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND COMMON PROPERTY
CS has attractive features for promoting efficient allocation and
reallocation of water under either (a) private property, market transfer situations or (b) systems wherein rights to water are held as common property with either zero, market or nonmarket water rights transfers.
However, CS has the added advantage that its non-attenuated property
rights structure, with a clear delineation of who is entitled to what portions of stored and flowing water, promotes the efficient allocation of
water when some water rights are privately held and some are held in
common. Some shares of the reservoir and streamflow resources can be
held and managed through time as common property while others can be
held by private users. Still other shares can be managed by some mix of
political and bureaucratic administration which would not affect the efficiency with which the private and commonly held shares are managed.
CS requires continuous accounting of each shareholders' streamflow and stored water volumes, so share holders know, at any time, the
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location of the water to which they are entitled. One reason to have large,
common property shareholdings, more common in less developed countries, is to allow for economies of size in monitoring and acting upon this
information. On the other hand, the tendency toward greater water use
efficiency when individual users directly confront the opportunity costs of
the water they use, is an advantage gained when shares are held by final,
private water users. Therefore, different economy-of-size situations may
call for different balances of private and common control.
CONCLUSION
CS is an effective mechanism for allocating the water resources of
large systems. It provides for a minimum amount of detrimental interaction between the beneficiaries, and a maximum amount of positive signals
to promote efficient resource use, for any mix of public control, private
property rights, and common property rights among water users.

